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DRONE WARFARE AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
RYAN J. VOGEL*
"[I]n all of our operations involving the use of force, including those in the
armed conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces, the Obama
Administration is committed by word and deed to conducting ourselves in
accordance with all applicable law.... [I]t is the considered view of this
Administration... that U.S. targeting practices, including lethal operations
conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, comply with all applicable
law, including the laws of war."
Harold Koh, U.S. State Department Legal Adviser1
"My concern is that these drones, these Predators, are being operated in a
framework which may well violate international humanitarian law and
international human rights law."
-Philip Alston, United Nations Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions2
The United States has increasingly relied upon unmanned aerial vehicles
(IA Vs), or "drones," to target and kill enemies in its current armed conflicts.
Drone strikes have proven to be spectacularly successful-both in terms offinding
and killing targeted enemies and in avoiding most of the challenges and
controversies that accompany using traditional forces. However, critics have
begun to challenge on a number of grounds the legality and morality of using
drones to kill belligerents in the non-traditional conflicts in which the United
States continues to fight. As drones become a growingfixture in the application of
modern military force, it bears examining whether their use for lethal targeting
* Foreign Affairs Specialist, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. B.S.
(Integrated Studies), magna cum laude, Utah Valley University; M.A. (International Affairs), magna
cum laude, American University; J.D., American University; L.L.M. candidate (Public International
Law, National Security Law), Georgetown University. The opinions expressed in this article are the
views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the United States
Government or of the Department of Defense. All statements and information used in this article are
drawn from the public record.
1. Harold Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, Keynote Address at the American Society for
International Law Annual Meeting: The Obama Administration and International Law (March 25,
2010), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm.
2. US Warned on Deadly Drone Attacks, BBC NEWS (Oct. 28, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/8329412.stm.
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operations violates the letter or spirit of the law of armed conflict. In this article I
identify the legalframework and sources of law applicable to the current conflicts
in which drones are employed; examine whether, and if so in what circumstances,
using drones for targeting operations violates the jus in bello principles of
proportionality, military necessity, distinction, and humanity and determine what
legal boundaries or limitations apply to the seemingly limitless capabilities of
drone warfare. I then evaluate whether the law of armed conflict is adequate for
dealing with the use of drones to target belligerents and terrorists in this non-
traditional armed conflict and ascertain whether new rules or laws are needed to
govern their use. I conclude by proposing legal and policy guidelines for the
lawful use of drones in armed conflict.
In an effort to reach remote territory and targets, save American blood and
treasure, achieve optimal accuracy and efficiency in targeting operations, and
perhaps to avoid the controversies3 surrounding the insertion of ground forces, the
United States has increasingly relied upon unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or
"drones," 4 to target and kill enemies in its current armed conflicts.5  The United
States has utilized drones to support combat and counterterrorism efforts across its
6theaters of armed conflict. Drone targeting has proven to be spectacularly
successful-both in terms of finding and killing targeted enemies and in avoiding
most of the challenges and controversies that accompany using traditional forces.
However, critics have begun to challenge on a number of grounds the legality and
morality of using drones to kill belligerents in the non-traditional conflicts in
3. In particular, relying on drones to remotely attack targets avoids the thorniest byproduct of
inserting ground forces in America's current conflicts: detention of enemy belligerents and security
threats.
4. In this paper I use the terms "drone" and "UAV" interchangeably. Recently, some have begun
to use the term "remotely-piloted aircraft," or "RPA," to describe UAVs, likely in an effort to
emphasize the human element of control with UAVs. However, while the RPA may be a more accurate
term, I use the terms UAV and drone in this paper for purposes of consistency and audience familiarity.
5. As explained by U.S. State Department Legal Adviser, Harold Koh, and mirroring the posture
taken by the U.S. Government in the Guantanamo habeas litigation and in its first universal periodic
review submission to the Human Rights Council, the Obama Administration considers the United States
to be "engaged in several armed conflicts": one in Iraq, one in Afghanistan, and importantly to this
discussion, another against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces both "in Afghanistan and
elsewhere." While the Obama Administration publicly purged the term "global war on tenror" from its
official lexicon, and wisely so, since the U.S. Government likely never intended to fight any form of
terrorism anywhere in the world, Harold Koh's expression of the Administration's position amounts to
a global war against specific terrorists - namely, al Qaeda, Taliban, and associated forces, including
those who substantially support or harbor them. This is no mere insignificant rhetorical modification:
the Obama Administration has expressly taken the previous administration's posture of fighting the
parties contemplated by the AUMF in a wartime framework anywhere in the world and applying the
law of armed conflict to any individuals they encounter in that fight, subject of course to
"considerations specific to each case, including those related to the imminence of the threat, the
sovereignty of the other states involved, and the willingness and ability of those states to suppress the
threat the target poses." See Koh, supra note 1. See also Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith,
Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARv. L. REv. 2047 (2005).
6. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on
Targeted Killings, Human Rights Council, 7, 18-22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010)
(by Phillip Alston).
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which the United States continues to fight.7 After much anticipation and
speculation in the international law community, and after promptings by the UN
and other organizations for the United States to deliver a legal justification for its
drone strikes, U.S. State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh addressed the
American Society for International Law's (ASIL) 2010 Annual Meeting and used
the occasion to present the "considered view" of the Obama Administration in
regards to U.S. targeting operations, particularly those conducted with drones.8
Koh explained that "great care is taken to adhere to [the principles of distinction
and proportionality].., in both planning and execution" of lethal targeting
operations, and asserted that such operations "comply with all applicable law,
including the laws of war." 9  As drones become a growing fixture in the
application of modem military force, it bears examining whether their use for
lethal targeting operations violates the letter or spirit of the law of armed conflict.10
In this article, I identify the legal framework and sources of law applicable to
the current conflicts in which drones are employed;11 examine whether, and in
what circumstances, using drones for targeting operations violates the jus in bello
principles of proportionality, military necessity, distinction, and humanity; and
determine what legal boundaries or limitations apply to the seemingly limitless
capabilities of drone warfare. I then evaluate whether the law of armed conflict is
adequate for dealing with the use of drones to target belligerents and terrorists in
this non-traditional armed conflict and ascertain whether new rules or laws are
needed to govern their use. I conclude that the law of armed conflict adequately
governs drone warfare and provides guiding principles for conducting drone strikes
within the letter and spirit of the law.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
The use of unmanned drones to target belligerents presents complex legal
issues for modem warfare. However, the appearance of new and advanced
weapons in warfare is hardly a new challenge in the history of armed conflict.
Technological progress has produced increasingly sophisticated means for
fighting, while laws to moderate or police their use have typically lagged far
behind. At different times in history, developments such as the crossbow,
gunpowder, machine guns, tanks, airplanes, noxious gasses, nuclear bombs, and a
number of other deadly inventions, irreversibly changed the landscape of warfare
and required groups and states to reassess the laws governing armed conflict. The
United Nations' call, then, for the United States to justify the legality of its drone
7. Id. at 18-22.
8. Koh, supra note 1.
9. Koh, supra note 1.
10. While experts have recognized substantive distinctions in the names used to describe the rules
governing armed conflicts, I prefer the term "law of armed conflict" and use it interchangeably with the
"law of war" and "international humanitarian law" in this article.
11. While I draw on U.S. law to help characterize the conflict, this article aims to examine the
issue of drone warfare through the lens of the international law of armed conflict. U.S. domestic law
applicable to the issue at hand is not the focus of this article.
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strike program 12 should not come as a surprise. Public officials, experts,
practitioners, operators, and lawyers are just now coming to grapple with the rules
and legal framework for the emerging use of drones in order to determine
guidelines for the use of this new technology.
13
Some of this concern is understandable, as drones seem to have moved
overnight to the front line of America's current armed conflicts. In reality, UAVs
languished for years in development and obscurity 14 before becoming, as CIA
Director Leon Panetta famously put it, "the only game in town."15 Even in the
early years of the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military rarely
utilized the emerging technology. In 2001, the Predator UAV fleet numbered only
ten and was typically relegated to reconnaissance missions, when used at all. 16 By
2007, Predators numbered more than 180, with plans to nearly double that number
17
over the next few years. In addition to the Predator drone (about 27 feet long and
capable of flying for 24 hours at up to 26,000 feet), the best known of the
American UAV fleet, the United States has increasingly employed a number of
other drones in the current conflicts, including the Global Hawk (the largest of the
fleet at 40 feet long and capable of flying for 35 hours and up to 65,000 feet), the
Shadow (only 12 feet long and capable of flying for 5 hours or 70 miles), the
Hunter (around 24 feet long and capable of flying twice as long as the Shadow),
the Raven Gust 38 inches long and only 4 pounds, capable of flying for 90 minutes
at about 400 feet), and the Wasp (even smaller than the Raven). 18 The smaller
drones of the UAV fleet are used primarily for reconnaissance and target
acquisition, while the larger drones are armed with Hellfire missiles and used to
conduct strikes, in addition to higher altitude reconnaissance.1 9 A number of other
UAVs are expected to be operated in the near future to update and expand
capabilities, including the Reaper, the Peregrine, and the Vulture.20 The Pentagon
12. US Warned on Deadly Drone Attacks, supra note 2.
13. A recent story in the Harvard National Security Journal poignantly illustrated the need for
such guidelines. Brett H. McGurk writes:
There is yet another reason to define clear standards for the drone program: 'In
warfare, what comes around - goes around' Tas Oelstrom emphasized that
simple maxim during the symposium, a point driven home by MIT's Mary
Cummings, who showed with alarming detail how easily drone technology is
patterned and even piloted with an iPhone. 'Yes,' she said, 'there is an app for
that.'
Brett H. McGurk, Lawyers: A Predator Drone's Achilles Heel?, HARVARD NAT'L SEC. J. (Mar. 11,
2010), http://www.harvardnsj.com/2010/03/lawyers-a-predator-drone's-achilles-heel/.
14. For a detailed history of the development and deployment of UAVs, see generally P.W.
Singer, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
(2009).
15. U.S. Air Strikes in Pakistan Called 'Very Effective,' CNN.COM (May 18, 2009, 6:48 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/05/18/cia.pakistan.airstrikes/.
16. P.W. Singer, Military Robots and the Laws of War, 23 THE NEW ATLANTIS 25, 37 (2009),
available at http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/military-robots-and-the-laws-of-war.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 37-39.
19. Id. at 39.
20. Id.
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has made producing and evolving all aspects of its drone fleet a top budgetary and
strategic priority for the coming years.21
B. Framing the Issues
It seems clear that the United States intends to advance and expand its UAV
program, including for lethal strike operations.22 Reportedly, more drone strikes
were carried out in President Barack Obama's first year in office than in the
previous eight years combined under George W. Bush, and 2010 has almost
doubled the pace of 2009.23 Indeed, over the past two years, a number of senior
Obama Administration officials have come out in defense of drone warfare.24
However, while the U.S. Government has been clear about its intent to use drones
for targeting operations, and while it has broadly defended its policy of conducting
strikes against parties contemplated by the Authorization for the Use of Military
Force (AUMF) the government's public proponents have rarely delved into
some of the weightier issues presented by drone warfare. A few hypotheticals may
help illustrate the preeminent issues:
Hypothetical 1: A military operator in Afghanistan identifies a Taliban target
within Afghanistan, determines through intelligence sources that the target is
reachable at his home and that the operation would meet the proportionality,
necessity, and humanity requirements under the law of armed conflict, and
employs a drone to conduct the kill operation.
Hypothetical 2: A military operator on a ship off the Horn of Africa identifies
a high-level al Qaeda target within Yemen, determines through intelligence
sources that the target is reachable while at a funeral and that the operation would
21. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW viii, 10-12, 18, 22, 101, 104,
available at http://www.defense.gov/qdr/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2010); U.S. DEP'T OF DEF.,
QUADRENNIAL ROLES AND MISSIONS 24-29 (Jan. 2009), available at http://www.defense.
gov/news/Jan2009/QRMFinalReport v26Jan.pdft see generally U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., FY 2009-2034
UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP 1, available at http://www.jointrobotics.com/
documents/library/UMS o20lntegrated o20Roadmap o202009.pdf.
22. Id.
23. Pakistan denies U.S. request to expand drone access, official says, CNN.COM (Nov. 22, 2010,
11:04 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/I 1/22/pakistan.us.drones/index.html.
24. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 1; U.S, Airstrikes in Pakistan Called 'Very Effective,' supra note 15
(recounting CIA Director Leon Panetta's defense of drone strikes); Future of Military Aviation Lies
with Drones: US Admiral, SPACE WAR (May 14, 2009), http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Future
of militaryaviation lies with drones US admiral_999.html (quoting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
Admiral Mullen, and Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, on the future use of UAVs in the military).
25. In this article, I will use the term "AUMF" as an adjective to reference the parties with which
the United States is at war under the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (Taliban, al
Qaeda, and associated forces) and the conflict in which the United States is engaged (e.g., AUMF foes,
AUMF enemies, AUMF parties, and AUMF conflict). Because both the Bush and the Obama
administrations rely on the AUMF for authority to conduct hostilities against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and
associated forces in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and because the label "global war on terrorism" has
been (wisely) abandoned, the tag "AUMF" most succinctly and accurately describes the conflict and
parties involved. See RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., RS 22357,
AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN RESPONSE TO THE 9/11 ATTACKS 3-4 (2007)
[hereinafter AUMF].
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meet the proportionality, necessity, and humanity requirements under the law of
armed conflict, and employs a drone to conduct the kill operation.
Hypothetical 3: A CIA operator in Kabul identifies a group of Jaish-e-
Muhammad fighters (known al Qaeda affiliates) in a Waziristan "safe house,"
determines through intelligence sources that the target is reachable and that the
operation would meet the proportionality, necessity, and humanity requirements
under the law of armed conflict, and employs a drone to conduct the kill operation.
Hypothetical 4: A CIA operator in Djibouti identifies al-Shabaab leaders
(loosely aligned with al Qaeda) in Somalia, determines through intelligence
sources that the targets are reachable at a meeting of associates and that the
operation would meet the proportionality, necessity, and humanity requirements
under the law of armed conflict, and employs a drone to conduct the kill operation.
A number of recurrent issues present themselves in these examples: (1)
Consent of the government where the strike occurs. Does it matter if the host
government consents to the strike, expressly opposes the strike, or is silent on the
matter? (2) Rank or importance of the targeted individual. Does a target need to
have sufficient rank or importance to be targeted? Do certain targets, because of
their seniority or importance, justify more latitude in regards to determining what
constitutes "acceptable" collateral damage? (3) Foreseeability of civilian losses.
Does it matter if the strike causes unforeseeable but disproportionate civilian
losses? In a conflict where the enemy intentionally fails to distinguish himself, and
indeed intentionally seeks to mask his combatant status as a matter of course, is
there a requirement to subject intelligence assessments to heightened levels of
scrutiny before targeting civilians who have lost their protected status by
participating in the hostilities? (4) Humanitarian objective. Does the United
States have an affirmative obligation to seek the less harmful option if a target
might just as easily, or within a reasonable range of practicability, be captured and
detained? (5) Location of the strike. Does the answer of legality differ if the strike
takes place within the recognized battlefield of Afghanistan, the border region of
Pakistan, the ungoverned spaces of Somalia, or the terrorist havens of Yemen?
Will the answer change if the strike occurs on the high seas or in a "neutral"
country or zone? (6) Location of the operator. Does it matter if the operator is
located within the same zone of hostilities or somewhere outside it? What if the
operator is located on a ship or in Nevada or Virginia? (7) Status of the operator.
Does it matter if the operator conducting the strike is a civilian or combatant
uniformed member of the armed forces? Where do CIA personnel fit into this
status characterization? In the proceeding sections, I will address each of these
questions and issues within the context of both current law governing armed
conflict and the realities of a new kind of war.
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND SOURCES OF LAW
A. Wartime or Criminal Legal Framework?
At the outset, it is important to identify the proper legal framework on which
to base our analysis. It should be noted, however, that the application of one legal
framework need not be exclusive to the application of another. In the war against
al Qaeda and its terrorist associates, if the government reasonably concludes that it
VOL. 39:1
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is involved in an "armed conflict," the government may properly utilize law of war
methods as well as criminal law enforcement methods for enforcement, detention,
and prosecution of terrorists, depending on the circumstances. In fact, the U.S.
Government has frequently used law enforcement personnel and resources, the
criminal code, and civilian courts to thwart, identify, apprehend, and try terrorists
before and since 9/11,26 and the Justice Department has signaled its intent to
continue to do so, including by trying some of the Guantanamo detainees in federal
court.
27
That said, the U.S. Government has made clear that it considers itself at war
in Afghanistan, Iraq, and with the parties contemplated by the AUMF.2 ' From
Koh's formal explanation in his 2010 ASIL speech, to language in presidential and
executive orders, court filings, human rights reports, and statements by senior
officials in both the Bush and Obama Administrations, the Executive Branch has
consistently characterized the current conflicts to be armed conflicts, governed
primarily by the lex specialis of the laws of war.29 Congress has also consistently,
and without exception, confirmed the Executive's characterization of the current
conflicts as armed conflicts.30  In addition, as the courts have reviewed issues of
detention and treatment of detainees, they have also dependably upheld the
political branches' characterization of the current conflicts as armed conflicts, to
which unique rules apply, from the Supreme Court's decisions in Hamdi and
Boumediene, to the most recent habeas decisions in the D.C. Circuit and the D.C.
District Court.31 Thus, all three branches of government,12 in both Republican and
26. See, e.g., JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR. & RICHARD B. ZABEL, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN PURSUIT
OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, 2009 UPDATE AND RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS 6 (2009) available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pdf/090723-LS-in-pursuit-
justice-09-update.pdf.
27. See, e.g., Attorney General Announces Forum Decisions for Guantanamo Detainees, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE (Nov. 13, 2009) available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech-
091113.html; DOJ Says Some Terror Suspects to be Tried in Federal Court, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC'Y
BLOG (Nov. 13, 2009, 12:48 PM), available at http://www.acslaw.org/node/14808. While there has
been controversy about trying terrorists in federal courts, in particular the 9/11 co-conspirators, the
Attorney General has consistently supported using federal courts for trying detainees at Guantanamo
and future captures.
28. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 1; Exec. Order No. 13234, 66 Fed. Reg. 221 (Nov. 9, 2001); Exec.
Order No. 13239, 66 Fed. Reg. 241 (Dec. 12, 2001); Military Order, 66 Fed. Reg. 222 (Nov. 13, 2001);
Respondents' Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority Relative to Detainees
Held at Guantanamo Bay, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, No. 08-442, 3 (D.C. March 13,
2009); President Barack Obarna, Remarks by the President on National Security, National Archives
(May 21, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/Remarks-by-the-President-
On-National-Security-5-21-09; Human Rights Council, U.S., Nat'l Report Submitted in Accordance
with Para. 15 (a) of the Annex to Human Rights Council Res. 51, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/9USA/1
(Aug. 23, 2010) available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/GIO/155/69/PDF/
G1015569.pdfOpenElement.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., AUMF, supra note 25, at 3-4; Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. §
2241(e)(2)); Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948(2)(a); see generally, National Defense
Authorization Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-84 (2009).
31. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557,
630-31 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507, 518-19 (2004); see also, Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F.
2010
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Democrat Administrations and Congresses, have consistently characterized the
situations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and with Taliban, al Qaeda, and associated forces
as that of an armed conflict governed by the laws of war.
As evidenced by Koh's ASIL speech, the United States couches its
foundational legal authority to target AUMF belligerents within the self-defense
terms of Article 51 from the UN Charter.33 The U.S. Government takes the
position that the events of September 11, 2001 constituted an "armed attack" by a
transnational terrorist organization, thereby triggering application of the laws of
armed conflict.34 Congress emphasized this fact when, in response to the 9/11
attacks, it authorized the President to exercise the country's "rights to self-defense"
and to "use all necessary and appropriate force" in order to prevent future acts of
terrorism against the United States.35 The Obama Administration, like its
predecessor, continues to rely on that statutory authority to use military force
against the parties described in the AUMF.
However, while the AUMF clearly provides the authority for the use of
military force, it offers a great deal of ambiguity for its application. For example,
the AUMF grants the president sweeping power to determine who falls within the
enemy forces.36 In a war against a shadowy and purposefully indistinct adversary,
this power to define the enemy is significant, even if operationally necessary.
Additionally, the AUMF does not impose geographical limitations of any kind.
3 7
While the law does not seem to contemplate a "global war on terror," it certainly
provides for a global war against specific terrorists - namely, al Qaeda, Taliban,
and associated forces, including those that substantially support or harbor them.38
Supp. 2d 43, 55 (DDC 2009).
32. The fact that all three branches agree on the characterization of the conflict places it squarely
within Justice Jackson's category of maximum executive authority in his Youngstown concurrence.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-39 (1952) (Jackson, J. concurring).
33. See Koh, supra note 1; U.N. Charter art. 51.
34. AUMF, supra note 25, at 5 (referencing article 5 of the Washington Treaty). The UN and
NATO also recognized that a state of armed conflict existed between the United States and the
perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks in New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Press
Release, Security Council, Security Council Unanimously Adopts Wide-Ranging Anti-Terrorism
Resolution, U.N. Press Release SC/7158 (Sep. 28, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/
News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm; G.A. Res. 56/1, 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/1 (Sep. 12, 2001),
available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/56/agresolution.htm; Press Release, Security
Council, Security Council Condemns in Strongest Terms Terrorist Attacks on United States, U.N. Press
Release SC/7143 (Sep. 12, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/SC714
3.doc.htm; Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General, Statement by NATO Secretary General (Oct. 2,
2001), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011002a.htm.
35. AUMF, supra note 25, at 6.
36. Id. at 4.
37. Instead, the AUMF provided the President authority to use force against specific targets -
those "nations, organizations, or persons" the President determined "planned, authorized, committed, or
aided" the terrorist attacks on 9/11 as well as those who "harbored such organizations or persons." Id. at
6. See also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5.
38. AUMF, supra note 25, at 3.
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This geographical expansiveness, and the line of logic that flows from it,39 has
been a lightning rod for criticism both within the United States and abroad. In fact,
some have argued that targeting operations conducted outside the geographical
battlefield do not fall under the law of armed conflict at all, but under the criminal
law, and therefore such operations constitute unlawful killings. 40 Those who take
this position typically oppose the idea of a "global battlefield," preferring the more
traditional territorially-contained battlefield - in this case, the territory of
Afghanistan.41 Of course, in practice, the United States will almost certainly not
embrace the broadest application of a "global battlefield" with regard to targeting
operations. If there is a government willing and able to either capture or kill a
sought-after belligerent within its territory, the United States is not likely to
undermine that state's sovereignty and risk the certain diplomatic blowback by
targeting the individual anyway. However, in countries such as Pakistan, Somalia,
and Yemen, where the respective governments maintain only partial control over
their territory and have proven incapable of eliminating, or unwilling to eliminate,
terrorist actors and activities, the United States has resorted to territorial incursions
through drone strikes.42 Koh notes that the decision of "whether a particular
individual will be targeted in a particular location will depend upon considerations
specific to each case, including those related to the imminence of the threat, the
sovereignty of the other states involved, and the willingness and ability of those
states to suppress the threat the target poses. '43 According to the United States, it
may conduct such strikes as long as the individuals (e.g., AUMF parties) are
39. Pressed on whether a "little old lady in Switzerland" could be considered an enemy combatant
if she donated money to al Qaeda, the United States Government responded in the affirmative. In re
Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 475 (D.D.C. 2005). The Obama Administration
may have come up with a different response, but it seems apparent that the underlying policy continues
of taking the fight to al Qaeda and their supporters wherever the United States finds them.
40. See, e.g., Rise of Drones II: Unmanned Systems and the Future of Warfare: Hearing before the
U.S. House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, 111 th Cong. 2 (Apr. 28, 2010)
(written testimony of Mary Ellen O'Connell, Professor, University of Notre Dame Law School),
available at http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/subcommittees/NS -Subcommittee/4.28. 10-
Drones Il/OConnell Statement.pdf [hereinafter Rise of Drones II]; Anthony D. Romero, Open Letter
to President Obama, COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV'T REFORM (Apr. 28, 2010),
http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/subcommittees/NS-Subcommittee/4.28. 10-Drones-11/2010 0
4 28 ACLU ADR Letter to PresidentObama.pdf, Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 16-20, Al-
Aulaqi v. Obama, No. 10-cv-01469 (D.D.C. Oct. 8, 2010), available athttp://www.aclu.org/
files/assets/ReplyBrief FINAL_100810.pdf.
41. See, e.g., Bridget Johnson, Kucinich: Policy of Drone Strikes Helping Stoke 'Fanaticism,'
'Radicalism,' The Hill: Blog, (Apr. 24, 2010, 12:20 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-
room/news/94127-kucinich-obama-policy-of-drone-strikes-helping-inspire-fanatacism-and-radicalism
(Representative Dennis Kucinich claims that the United States is violating international law by
attacking a country-Pakistan-we are not at war with and who has not attacked us).
42. See, e.g., Scott Shane, Mark Mazzetti & Robert F.Worth, A Secret Assault on Terror Widens
on Two Continents, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/15/
world/15shadowwar.html.
43. Koh, supra note 1.
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lawfully targetable as belligerents or civilians who have forfeited their protected
status."
B. Characterization of the Conflict
While the three branches of the government agree that a state of armed
conflict exists and primarily rely upon the law of armed conflict to govern the fight
with the groups listed in the AUMF, particularly with regard to lethal targeting
operations, the inquiry to identify the proper legal framework does not end there -
the law of armed conflict has different rules for the different types of conflict.
"International armed conflicts" are traditional armed conflicts between states and
are governed by the 1907 Hague Conventions, the four Geneva Conventions of
1949,46 custom, and, to those that are party, the first Additional Protocol to the
Geneva Conventions (AP 1). 47  "Conflicts not of an international character" (or
"non-international armed conflicts") are armed conflicts between states and non-
state actors, including but not limited to internal armed conflicts, and are governed
by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions,48 custom, domestic law, and,49
44. See infra section III(B)(1) for a fuller explanation on the implications of civilians losing their
protected status.
45. Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 [hereinafter Hague IV].
46. See The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6.3 U.S.T. 3114, 3116, T.I.A.S. No.3362, at 3, 75
U.N.T.S. 31, 32 [GC I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6.3 U.S.T. 3217, 3220,
T.I.A.S. No.3363, at 4, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 86 [GC II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment to
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6.3 U.S.T. 3316, 3318, T.I.A.S. No. 3364., at 3, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136
[GC III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6.3 U.S.T. 3516, 3518, T.I.A.S. No.3365, at 3, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 288 [GC IV] [all four hereinafter
Geneva Conventions].
47. The United States signed AP I but never submitted it to the Senate for advice and consent. See
Guy B. Roberts, The New Rules for Waging War: The Case Against Ratification of Additional Protocol
1, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 109, 110 (1985). The U.S. Government has been consistently critical of some of its
terms throughout the years, particularly with regard to rules concerning unlawful participants in
hostilities and the combatant's privilege. See, e.g., George H. Aldrich, Prospects for the United States
Ratification ofAdditional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3-4 (1991).
However, many in the international community, including the United States, have argued that large
parts of Protocol I reflect custom. See, e.g., Hans-Peter Gasser, An Appeal for Ratification by the United
States, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 912, 914 (1987). The U.S. government has taken the position in the past that
the provisions of Article 75 represent "an articulation of safeguards to which all persons in the hands of
an enemy are entitled." Hlamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 663 (2006) (quoting William H. Taft IV,
Law of Armed Conflict After 911: Some Salient Features, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 319, 322 (2003)).
Nevertheless, the scope of customary international law (CIL) is controversial within the United States
Government. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, U.N.
Doc. A/32/144, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter AP I].
48. Common Article 3 is the only article in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 to provide rules
for "armed conflict[s] not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties." GC I-IV, supra note 46, art. 3.
49. Some experts have argued that the lack of substantive law for non-international armed
conflicts, or internal armed conflicts, reflects the intent for either domestic law or human rights law to
fill in the gaps. See, e.g., Gabor Rona, Obama Administration Must Define "Enemy Combatant"
VOL. 39:1
DRONE WARFARE
to those that are party, the second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions
(AP II).50 Some have pointed to the existence of a third category-
internationalized non-international armed conflicts, or conflicts between states and
non-state actors that feature additional states on one or both sides-and have
argued that, because these conflicts are not expressly contemplated by the
traditional laws of war, rules from both types of conflict should govern where
appropriate.51
With these categories in mind, the AUMF conflict presents challenges for
proper characterization. The United States was not and has never been in an
international armed conflict with al Qaeda, since al Qaeda is not a state and has no
government and is therefore incapable of fighting as a party to an inter-state
conflict. 52  It is arguable, however, that the United States was at least initially
engaged in an international armed conflict with the Taliban as the functional
government of Afghanistan, and with al Qaeda forces supporting the Taliban as a
Consistent With Traditional Laws of War, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (February 17, 2009),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pdf/091020-LS-rona-obama-admin-define-combatant.pdf. The U.S.
Government has asserted that only Common Article 3 applies directly as applicable treaty law to the
AUMF conflict, but has preferred to draw analogies from the law of international armed conflict to fill
gaps rather than apply human rights law or domestic law. See, e.g., Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630-31.
50. The United States signed AP II and submitted it to the Senate for advice and consent in 1987
where it remains before Senate subcommittees. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts,
opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977)
[hereinafter AP II]; see also Gasser, supra note 47, at 912; Roberts, supra note 47, at 110. Much like
with Protocol I, many have asserted that certain provisions in Protocol II have achieved the status of
custom. See, e.g., Gasser, supra note 47, at 912.
51. See, e.g., ROBERT K. GOLDMAN & BRIAN TITTEMORE, UNPRIVILEGED COMBATANTS AND THE
HOSTILITIES IN AFGHANISTAN: THEIR STATUS AND RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 24 n. 82 (2002), available at http://www.asil.org/taskforce/goldman.pdf In
the report he notes that such conflicts are:
Hybrid conflicts in that they are not governed entirely by either international or
internal armed conflict rules. Because the Geneva Conventions contain no
provisions applicable to these kinds of conflicts, the solution followed by most
international lawyers has been to break down the armed conflict into its
international and domestic components and, based on this differentiation, to
identify the humanitarian law rules governing relations between the various
warring parties.
See also Dietrich Schindler, International Humanitarian Law and Internationalized Internal Armed
Conflicts, 22 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 255, 258-61 (1982).
52. But see Brief for Respondents at 48, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184),
2006 WL 460875 (arguing that "[a]s the President determined, because the conflict between the United
States and al Qaeda has taken place and is ongoing in several countries, the conflict is 'of an
international character'). However, the Hamdan Court disagreed with the government's position,
finding:
The Court of Appeals thought, and the Government asserts, that Common Article
3 does not apply to Hamdan because the conflict with al Qaeda, being
'international in scope,' does not qualify as a 'conflict not of an international
character.' ... That reasoning is erroneous.... In context, then, the phrase 'not
of an international character' bears its literal meaning.
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630-31.
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kind of militia.53 The Taliban maintained some form of governance over
Afghanistan, occupied the capital, conducted foreign relations, and proved to be
the most powerful military force in the country with its defeat of rival tribal
alliances. 4 However, because the Taliban was only recognized by a handful of
states as the rightful government of Afghanistan,55 did not occupy Afghanistan's
seat at the UN, and maintained only erratic control over large portions of its own
territory, the Taliban may not have met the basic requirements for recognition as
Afghanistan's government.56 Additionally, while most of the conflict with Taliban
forces occurred within the borders of Afghanistan, fighting and targeting, including
through drone strikes, of non-Taliban belligerents and terrorists took place
throughout the region.57 In any event, after Afghanistan ratified a new constitution
and elected a democratic government in January and October of 2004,
respectively, followed by the new government fighting alongside U.S. Forces and
International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), the conflict would no longer
qualify as "international."
However, characterization of the conflict as non-international is also difficult.
Although there are no states fighting against states in the current conflict, the
drafters of the Geneva Conventions seemed to be thinking more of internal armed
conflicts when they provided the sparse terms for "armed conflicts not of an
international character" in Common Article 3 and not of global struggles with
transnational non-state actors.58 It seems at least debatable, then, that the AUMF
53. Even if al Qaeda forces acted as a Taliban militia, fought alongside them in defense of Afghan
territory, and considered themselves a part of the opposition force, it is doubtful that al Qaeda fighters
would have qualified for the protected status outlined in GC III, art. 4(A)(1) and (2). Al Qaeda fighters
were not a regular militia or volunteer corps forming "part of' Afghanistan's armed forces as
contemplated by art. 4(A)(1); similarly, al Qaeda did not satisfy three of the four listed criteria in art.
4(A)(2) required of "other militias" to earn protected combatant status: they did not wear a fixed sign,
they did not carry arms openly, and they did not conduct their activities in compliance with the law of
war.
54. See Greg Bruno, The Taliban in Afghanistan, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS:
BACKGROUNDER (August 3, 2009), http://www.cfr.org/publication/10551/taliban in afghanistan.html;
see also Saeed Shah, Taliban Rivals Unite to Fight US Troop Surge, THE GUARDIAN (March 3, 2009),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/03/taliban-pakistan-afghanistan-us-surge.
55. On September 11, 2001, only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates
recognized the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan. Tony Karon, Time. com Primer: The Taliban
and Afghanistan, TIME.COM (Sept. 18, 2001), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/ 0,8599,175372,
00.html.
56. At a basic level, state practice suggests that a political entity must fulfill four criteria to
achieve international recognition as a country's government: (1) assume a permanent character, (2)
prove itself to be substantially in control of the country, (3) demonstrate the support of the majority of
the country, and (4) show the ability to abide by international agreements. See Convention on Rights
and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19. Some have argued that the Taliban
met the first three of these criteria, but its abhorrent human rights record and failure to comply with
international agreements led all but three countries to refuse recognition of the Taliban as the
government of Afghanistan. See Karon, supra note 55.
57. See, e.g., Ismail Khan & Salman Masood, Drone Strikes Reported in Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 6, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/07/world/asia/07drones.html.
58. See, e.g., Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Memorandum for
Alberto R. Gonzales Counsel to the President, Treaties and Laws Applicable to the Conflict in
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conflict may transcend the characterization of "non-international" and more
closely resemble an "international armed conflict," since the United States not only
fights in a number of countries but fights alongside both Afghan forces and a
coalition of UN-sanctioned ISAF forces. At least for purposes of filling gaps in
the law, analogizing the AUMF conflict to international armed conflicts might
provide a fuller and more comprehensive set of rules than by looking to the
customary rules supporting non-international armed conflicts or to some other less
relevant body of law. The Bush Administration consistently asserted that the
conflict with AUMF parties was international - particularly with regard to the
global fight against al Qaeda. 59 However, taking its position from the Supreme
Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,6 the Obama Administration now takes
the position that the conflict is non-international in nature. 61  For purposes of
determining the proper legal framework for targeting operations in the AUMF
conflict, the Court's determination that the fight with al Qaeda and associates is a
non-international armed conflict and the current Administration's adoption of that
characterization sufficiently answers this preliminary question.
C. Sources ofLaw
It follows, then, that the primary legal framework applicable to drone attacks
conducted in the current conflict is the lex specialis of armed conflict, and that the
status of this conflict is non-international. As a result, as noted above, Common
Article 3 and customary international law, including provisions from Additional
Protocols I and II, expressly apply as sources of law for this conflict. In addition,
Afghanistan and to the Treatment of Persons Captured by U.S. Armed Forces In that Conflict (Nov. 30,
2001), http://wwwjustice.gov/olc/docs/aclu-ii-113001.pdf (Yoo argues that while the rules of
international armed conflict do not apply to al Qaeda, Common Article 3 also does not cover the
conflict between a state Party and a non-state actor:
There is substantial reason to think that this language [common Article 3] refers
specifically to a condition of civil war, or a large-scale armed conflict between a
State and an armed movement within its territory.... Analysis of the background
to the adoption of the Geneva Conventions in 1949 confirms our understanding
of common Article 3. It appears that the drafters of the Conventions had in mind
only the two forms of armed conflict that were regarded as matters of general
international concern at the time: armed conflict between Nation States (subject
to Article 2), and large-scale civil war within a Nation State (subject to Article 3).
• . . [C]ommon Article 3 should not be read to include all forms of non-
international armed conflict.).
59. See, e.g., Memorandum from George W. Bush, Humane Treatment of Taliban and al Qaeda
Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), http://www.pegc.us/archive/WhiteHouse/bush-memo_20020207 ed.pdf.
60. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630, 633 (2006). The Court did not take a position on
whether the conflict had always been non-international or whether that mattered, but it did expressly
reject the Executive's argument that the conflict was international. In finding that the conflict with the
Taliban and al Qaeda is non-international in character, the Hamdan Court correctly determined that
Common Article 3 governs. Id. at 630. Interestingly, though, the Court looked to Article 75 of
Protocol I to flesh out the terms of Common Article 3 instead of Articles 4-6 of Protocol II. Id at 633.
Protocol I expressly supplements the rules for international armed conflicts, while Protocol II
supplements the rules for non-international armed conflicts. See AP I, supra note 47; AP II, supra note
50.
61. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 1.
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the UN Charter provides basic jus ad bellum rules for the application and use of
force.62 So, too, do other treaties generally applicable to armed conflict apply to
targeting operations in a non-international armed conflict, including the 1980
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons (CCW), and the customary provisions within the 1998 Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court.63 In order to supplement the relatively sparse
terms of the law of non-international armed conflicts, the United States has also
chosen to use international armed conflict principles from the Hague and Geneva
Conventions by analogy.64 And, of course, whatever domestic rules Congress, the
President, or the Department of Defense prescribe for the current conflicts apply as
sources of law, subject to an expanding role for the courts in reviewing aspects of
the rules adopted by the Executive or Legislative branches (e.g., in Hamdan and
Boumediene).
The President may still choose to treat belligerents as criminals within a law
enforcement framework, including by apprehending suspects and prosecuting them
in federal courts for violations of federal criminal law, including the War Crimes
Act. But he is under no obligation to do so, and he may continue to use the law of
war framework for targeting operations for as long as hostilities endure between
the United States and the Taliban and al Qaeda, respectively.65
III. DRONE STRIKES UNDER THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT'S FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES
The Obama Administration has been quick to note that targeting operations
against the AUMF foes not only meets the requirements of black letter law and
relevant custom, but is "conducted consistently with law of war principles," with
"great care.., taken to adhere to these principles in both planning and execution. ' ' 66
Traditionally, the fundamental principles of the jus in bello are composed of (a)
military necessity, (b) distinction, and (c) proportionality, with many now adding
to the list (d) the principle of humanity.
62. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; U.N. Charter art. 51, para. 1; see also Karma Nabulsi,
Jus ad BellumIJus in Bello in CRIMES OF WAR A-Z GUIDE (2nd ed. 2007), available at
http://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/jus-ad-bellum.html.
63. See Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980,
1342 U.N.T.S. 137, 19 I.L.M. 1523, available at http://lawofwar.org/cxonventional weapons
convention.htm [hereinafter CCW]; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8, July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3, 37 I.L.M. 1002 [hereinafter ICC].
64. See, e.g., Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 603-04.
65. As recognized by GC III, art. 118, parties to a conflict may hold captured belligerents until the
cessation of hostilities. In addition, because the belligerents in the AUMF conflict are unprivileged,
they are susceptible to criminal punishment even if detained under the law of armed conflict (LOAC).
See Goldman & Tittemore, supra note 51, at 1, 4.
66. Koh, supra note 1.
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A. The Principle of Military Necessity
Because it is military necessity that drives targeting operations, I begin the
analysis with this principle. Generally considered to reflect international custom,
67
Article 52 of Geneva Protocol I requires that armed attacks in wartime be "limited
strictly to military objectives" and offer "a definite military advantage. 68  The
U.S. Army adds in its field manual on the law of war that military necessity is
"[t]hat principle which justifies those measures not forbidden by international law
which are indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as
soon as possible., 69 Also of note, Article 23 of Hague IV forbids "destroy[ing] or
seiz[ing] the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively
demanded by the necessities of war,, 70 and Article 8 of the Rome Statute defines
as a war crime attacks against civilian objects and "[d]estroying or seizing the
enemy's property unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by
the necessities of war.
71
For purposes of this analysis, then, the general question of whether drone
strikes meet a military necessity is a relatively easy one. As noted above, a
number of U.S. Government officials have over the past few years confirmed that
drones are an invaluable tool against al Qaeda, Taliban, and associated terrorist
72forces. In some areas, they are, as the CIA director put it, "the only game in
town" because of their ability to find and identify targeted persons and reach into
territory that ground forces cannot enter, either for military or political reasons. In
one reported case, the United States targeted a senior Taliban official in the
impenetrable border region of Pakistan, while he was resting on the roof of a house
with his wife and hooked up to a drip for kidney problems 3.7  He was wanted for
his involvement in a number of suicide bombings and the assassination of
Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. The United States would surely assert
that in such a situation and others like them, the drone strike offers a "definite
military advantage," particularly in a war that is transnational in scope and with
enemies intent on hiding among civilians and within failed or semi-failed states
and territories. Likewise, the United States would likely argue that such attacks
67. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 14
(2005) [hereinafter FM 27-10]; see also Michael J. Matheson, The United States Position on the
Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 419, 420 (1987).
68. AP I, supra note 47, art. 52(2).
69. F.M. 27-10, supra note 67, at 164.
70. Hague IV, supra note 45, art. 23(g).
71. ICC, supra note 63, art. 8. The ICC creates a distinction between international and non-
international armed conflicts, with more rules for the former.
72. See US, Airstrikes in Pakistan Called 'Very Effective,' supra note 15. CIA Director Leon
Panetta famously stated in May 2009 that drones were "the only game in town in terms of confronting
or trying to disrupt the al Qaeda leadership," asserting that they have been "very precise" and "very
limited in terms of collateral damage." Id.
73. Peter Finn & Joby Warrick, Under Panetta, A More Aggressive CIA, WASH. POST, Mar. 21,
2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/20/AR2010032
003343.html. See also Radio Interview by Michael Smerconish with President Obama (Aug. 20, 2009),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/radio-interview-president-michael-smerconish.
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against belligerents when and where they present themselves is "indispensable for
securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible. 74 All reports
indicate that drone attacks have become a central part of the U.S. arsenal in the
current conflicts and officials have consistently commented on the significant
military advantage they offer.75
However, evaluating whether conducting a lethal drone strike operation is a
military necessity, like evaluating the use of any weapon or weapon platform,
requires a case-by-case analysis. In each application, the commander or operator
must affirmatively answer that the particular attack in question offers a distinct
military advantage for the accomplishment of a military goal. Drone strikes are no
different than any other tool or application of force in this respect.
B. The Principle of Distinction
Of course, military necessity is weighed against the other three constraining
principles, including the principle of distinction. Considered to reflect a customary
defimition of distinction, Article 48 of AP I requires that parties to a conflict "at all
times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants, and between
civilian objects and military objectives. '76 Article 52 then defines those military
objectives as "those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make
an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction,
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite
military advantage., 77 Focusing on the non-combatants in close proximity to the
conflict, Article 51 of AP I requires parties to ensure that "[t]he civilian population
and individual civilians ...enjoy general protection against dangers arising from
military operations," and "not be the object of attack. 78 Article 51 also prohibits
and defines "indiscriminate attacks. 79  Ambiguously, and therefore more
74. F.M. 27-10, supra note 67, at 164.
75. See, e.g., U.S, Airstrikes in Pakistan Called 'Very Effective,' supra note 15.
76. AP I, supra note 47, art. 48.
77. Id. art. 52(2). Notably, where there is doubt as to whether a civilian object is being used to
"make an effective contribution to military action," article 52(3) stipulates that: it shall be presumed not
to be so used." Id. art. 52(2), (3). The U.S. Army Field Manual adds more detail at para. 40(c):
Military objectives include, for example, factories producing munitions and
military supplies, military camps, warehouses storing munitions and military
supplies, ports and railroads being used for the transportation of military supplies,
and other places that are for the accommodation of troops or the support of
military operations. Pursuant to the provisions of [Hague IV, art. 25], however,
cities, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which may be classified as military
objectives, but which are undefended (para. 39 b), are not permissible objects of
attack.
F.M. 27-10, supra note 67, para. 40(c).
78. AP I, supra note 47, arts. 51(1), (2). The provisions from Article 51 are considered to reflect
custom. F.M. 27-10, supra note 67, para. 25.
79. AP I, supra note 47, art. 51(4). According to Article 51(4):
Indiscriminate attacks are: (a) those which are not directed at a specific military
objective; (b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be
directed at a specific military objective; or (c) those which employ a method or
means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this
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controversially, Article 51(3) forbids the targeting of civilians "unless and for such
time as they take a direct part in hostilities. 80  Significantly for this analysis,
Article 13 of AP II, governing non-international armed conflicts, provides a
version of these provisions from AP I, albeit in pared-down form?.8  Also of note,
the Rome Statute includes as war crimes a number of offenses against civilians and
civilian objects stemming from failures to adequately distinguish.
More specific to air strikes, Article 25 of the 1907 Hague IV Convention
prohibits aerial bombardment "by whatever means" of undefended towns, villages,
or dwellings.83 And, Article 26 requires a commander to do "all in his power" to
Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military
objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction." Id. In addition,
Article 51(5) lists "the following types of attacks" as examples of those that are
indiscriminate: "(a) an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which
treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct
military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a
similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects; and (b) an attack which may
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
Id. art. 51(5).
80. AP I, supra note 47, art. 51(3). Notably, AP II, article 13(3) contains the same provision. AP
II, supra note 50, art. 13(3). Sections III(B)(1) and IV(C) of this article address the controversy
surrounding this language in detail.
81. Art. 13 provides:
1) The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection
against the dangers arising from military operations. To give effect to this
protection, the following rules shall be observed in all circumstances. 2) The
civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object
of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread
terror among the civilian population are prohibited. 3) Civilians shall enjoy the
protection afforded by this part, unless and for such time as they take a direct part
in hostilities.
AP II, supra note 50, art. 13.
82. In Article 8(2)(b) the following represent "serious violations of the laws and customs
applicable in international armed conflict," and constitute war crimes under the statute for international
armed conflicts:
(i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or
against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;
(ii) Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which
are not military objectives;
(iv) Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which
would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military
advantage anticipated;
(v) Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings or
buildings which are undefended and which are not military objectives.
ICC, supra note 63, arts. 8(2)(b), (e). Note that only (i) is repeated in Article 8(2)(e) as a war crime for
non-international armed conflicts. Id art. 8(2)(e).
83. Hague IV, supra note 45, art. 25.
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warn "authorities" before an aerial bombardment, "except in cases of assault. 84 In
addition, while never formally entered into force, the 1923 Hague Rules
Concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air Warfare
provides a number of specific rules that may reflect custom for aerial warfare that
apply to all air targeting operations, including those conducted with drones.
Article 22 forbids "[a]ny air bombardment for the purpose of terrorizing the civil
population or destroying or damaging private property without military character
or injuring non-combatants. 86  Article 24(1) then provides that "[a]n air
bombardment is legitimate only when it is directed against a military objective, i.e.
an objective whereof the total or partial destruction would constitute an obvious
military advantage for the belligerent., 87 Moreover, Article 24(3) forbids aircraft
from conducting "undiscriminating bombardment. 88
Thus, it seems clear from convention and customary law that in order for a
drone strike to comply with the principle of distinction, the operator may target
only combatants or military objectives, and not civilians or civilian objects, unless
the civilian or object has forfeited his protected status by participating in the
hostilities. The difficulty with the AUMF conflict is that the line between
combatant and civilian, and military objective and civilian object, is often blurry
and undefined. Therefore, in order to determine whether U.S. drone strikes meet
the requirements of distinction we must establish (i) whether the strikes
sufficiently distinguish between civilian and military targets, taking into account
the loss of civilian protected status by direct participants, and (ii) whether the
attacks are conducted indiscriminately, or without regard to the effects on the
civilian population.
1. Do Drone Strikes Distinguish Between Civilian and Military Targets?
The difficulty with the AUMF conflict is that the enemy intentionally fails to
distinguish himself-indeed purposefully obfuscating his belligerent status by
posing as a civilian-and in many cases targets civilians and conducts operations
in civilian settings. Al Qaeda and its associates also routinely use protected
persons and objects as shields.89 The United States is thus often forced to fight
AUMF parties in a civilian context. This situation requires the United States to do
all it can to ensure that it is targeting the right kind of individuals (belligerents),
and, if civilians are targeted, to ensure that such individuals have forfeited their
protected status by directly participating in hostilities.
84. Id. art 26.
85. Rules concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air Warfare.
Drafted by a Commission of Jurists at the Hague, December 1922 - February 1923.
86. Id. art. 22.
87. Id. art. 24(1).
88. Id. art. 24(3).
89. See, e.g., Ron Synovitz, U.S. Says AJ-Qaeda Used Afghan Children as Human Shields, RADIO
FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY (June 18, 2007), http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1077179.html;
Afghanistan Midyear Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 2010, UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN, (Aug. 2010), http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/LUNAMA/
Publication/August102010 MID-YEAR%20REPORT o202010_Protection 0o2ofo2oCivilians o20in
o20Armed o20Conflict.pdf.
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As noted above, only combatants (or civilians who directly participate in
hostilities)90 may be lawfully targeted in an armed conflict.91 Lawful combatants
are those individuals who fight for a state's armed forces or militia, or belong to
one of the groups described in GC III, Article 4 and report to a responsible chain of
command, distinguish themselves, carry their arms openly, and conduct their
actions in compliance with the laws and customs of war.9 2 If an individual does
not meet these criteria, he is not a lawful combatant and is engaging in the conflict
without privilege; therefore, he is either an unlawful combatant (or unprivileged
belligerent) or a civilian who has forfeited his protected status.93 Members of al
Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associates do not meet the requirements of lawful
combatancy, 94 and therefore are unlawful combatants or unprotected civilians.
The question of when, or under what circumstances, a civilian loses his
protected status has long been debated and is of great import to the issue at hand.
In an attempt to flesh out the meaning of the phrase, "unless and for such time as
they take a direct part in hostilities,"95 the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) conducted a five-year study and consultation with experts, resulting
96in its issuing guidance for determining the proper interpretation. According to
the ICRC report, a person must perform a "continuous combat function" in order to
be targetable as a combatant.97  The ICRC distinguishes the case of civilians
90. The concept of civilian participation in hostilities is addressed in the immediate paragraphs
below.
91. In a non-international armed conflict, some argue that the law of war does not recognize a
combatant status for any but the state actor's armed forces. Thus, it becomes even more important to
determine when civilians lose their protected status and become targetable.
92. GC III, supra note 46, art. 4. For a comprehensive and authoritative analysis on
privileged/unprivileged belligerency, see Richard R. Baxter, So Called Unprivileged Belligerency:
Spies, Guerrillas and Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 323, 323-46 (1951); see also GOLDMAN &
TITTEMORE, supra note 51, at 2-4 (identifying the characteristics of lawful combatants/privileged
belligerents, and unlawful combatants/unprivileged belligerents).
93. But see Marco Sassoli, Use and Abuse of the Laws of War in the "War on Terrorism," 22
LAW & INEQ. 195, 209 (2004); Goldman & Tittemore, supra note 51, at 32 n.108. Some in the
international community have refuted the notion that there is a third category in the law of war, separate
from combatants and civilians. However, such critics note that even characterizing terrorists as
civilians does not lead to perverse results - so long as such individuals "take a direct part in hostilities"
and directly aid the efforts of the enemy, they forfeit their protected civilian status and become as
targetable as combatants.
94. Members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associates do not meet any of the requirements
from GC III, art. 4, i.e., they do not belong to a state party, do not constitute an accompanying militia,
and do not meet the four criteria (distinctive sign or uniform, carry arms openly, chain of command, and
compliance with the laws of war) to grant them the combatant's privilege. But see POWs or Unlawful
Combatants? CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, (Jan. 2002), http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/pow-
intro.html (taking the position that the Taliban and possibly al Qaeda met the requirements for POW
status as of 2002).
95. AP I, supra note 47, art. 51(3); AP II, supra note 50, art. 13(3).
96. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 33-35 (2009), available
at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/p0990/$FileICRC 002 0990.PDF [hereinafter
ICRC DPH Guidance].
97. Id. at 34. The ICRC continues:
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engaged in a "continuous combat function," who make up the "organized fighting
forces" of a non-state actor, from "civilians who directly participate in hostilities
on a merely spontaneous, sporadic, or unorganized basis, or who assume
exclusively political, administrative or other non-combat functions. 98 Civilians
who engage in such temporary or non-combat conduct, the ICRC argues, may only
be targeted for the time they are engaged in hostile conduct.99
Of course, many disagree with the ICRC's position on the meaning of direct
participation in hostilities. 100 The Obama Administration, for example, suggests
that individuals who are merely "part of.. an armed group are belligerents and,
therefore, lawful targets under international law."10 1  "Indeed," Koh asserts,
Continuous combat function requires lasting integration into an organized armed
group acting as the armed forces of a non-State party to an armed conflict. Thus,
individuals whose continuous function involves the preparation, execution, or
command of acts or operations amounting to direct participation in hostilities are
assuming a continuous combat function. An individual recruited, trained and
equipped by such a group to continuously and directly participate in hostilities on
its behalf can be considered to assume a continuous combat function even before
he or she first carries out a hostile act.
Id.
98. Id. at 33-34. More specifically, the ICRC continues, those designated as engaged in
"continuous combat function" must be distinguished from:
Persons comparable to reservists who, after a period of basic training or active
membership, leave the armed group and reintegrate into civilian life. Such
,reservists' are civilians until and for such time as they are called back to active
duty. Individuals who continuously accompany or support an organized armed
group, but whose function does not involve direct participation in hostilities, are
not members of that group within the meaning of IHL. Instead, they remain
civilians assuming support functions, similar to private contractors and civilian
employees accompanying State armed forces. Thus, recruiters, trainers,
financiers and propagandists may continuously contribute to the general war
effort of a non-State party, but they are not members of an organized armed
group belonging to that party unless their function additionally includes activities
amounting to direct participation in hostilities. The same applies to individuals
whose function is limited to the purchasing, smuggling, manufacturing and
maintaining of weapons and other equipment outside specific military operations
or to the collection of intelligence other than of a tactical nature. Although such
persons may accompany organized armed groups and provide substantial support
to a party to the conflict, they do not assume continuous combat function and, for
the purposes of the principle of distinction, cannot be regarded as members of an
organized armed group. As civilians, they benefit from protection against direct
attack unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities, even
though their activities or location may increase their exposure to incidental death
or injury.
Id. at 34-35.
99. Id. at 70 (conceding that civilians may be targeted if they are on their way or returning from
hostilities, but insisting that the "'revolving door' of civilian protection is an integral part, not a
malfunction, of IHL").
100. See, e.g., W. Hays Parks, Direct Participation in Hostilities: Perspectives on the ICRC
Interpretive Guidance: Part IX of the ICRC "Direct Participation In Hostilities" Study: No Mandate,
No Expertise, andLegally Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 769 (2010).
101. Koh, supra note 1.
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"targeting particular individuals serves to narrow the focus when force is employed
and to avoid broader harm to civilians and civilian objects. ' 102 Yoram Dinstein
similarly argues:
[A] person is not allowed to wear simultaneously two caps: the hat of a
civilian and the helmet of a soldier. A person who engages in military
raids by night, while purporting to be an innocent civilian by day, is
neither a civilian nor a lawful combatant. He is an unlawful combatant.
He is a combatant in the sense that he can be lawfully targeted by the
enemy, but he cannot claim the privileges appertaining to lawful
combatancy. Nor does he enjoy the benefits of civilian status. 103
The ICRC's position that participants who only "sporadically" involve
themselves in hostilities or who are not engaged in combat-type functions (and
therefore not part of an organized fighting force) may not be targeted seems to
misunderstand grossly the nature of the AUMF conflict. As a transnational non-
state terrorist organization, al Qaeda's sole purpose is to achieve ideological
objectives through violent means. Presumably, every member of al Qaeda and its
affiliates supports that unlawful mission - from the propagandists to the financiers,
and from the religious leaders to the front-line fighters. In fact, al Qaeda members
are often ordered to remove themselves from the fight for a time in order to re-
group, train, switch theaters, join "sleeper cells," and a variety of other reasons. 104
In each scenario, the member is still very much engaged in hostilities (or
performing a "continuous combat function") against the United States by actively
following orders and participating according to his assigned duties. But under the
ICRC's definition, such individuals would likely not be covered under the
designation. Thus, to allow a state to target a terrorist only for such time as he is
engaged in an actual hostile act is to give the terrorist the best of both worlds - the
protections of a civilian and the rights of a combatant. Presumably, it is for this
reason that the U.S. government takes a broader view of which individuals fall
under the category of belligerents or unprotected civilians who are targetable under
the law of war.
So, too, is there debate on when, or under what circumstances, a civilian
object gives up its protected status. The argument turns upon the "nature, location,
purpose, or use" of the object. 10 5 If a civilian object is employed in such a way that
its nature, location, purpose, or use meets the criteria for a military objective as
defined in Article 52 of AP I, that object loses its protected status and may be
targeted. 106 Of course, military objectives must also make an "effective
102. Id.
103. YORAM DINSTEN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICT 29 (2004).
104. Eric Schmitt & Jane Perlez, Strikes Worsen Qaeda Threat, Pakistan Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
25, 2010, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/25/world/asia/25drones.html.
105. AP I, supra note 47, art 52(2).
106. Dinstein, supra note 103, at 88. Dinstein offers a definition for each of these terms:
Nature denotes the intrinsic character of the military objective. . . . [T]he
'purpose' of a military objective is determined either by its (inherent) nature or
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contribution to military action" and "offer[] a definite military advantage."1 0 7 In
the AUMF conflict, this analysis comes up frequently; drones often strike civilian
houses, businesses, and vehicles, which by their nature, location, purpose, or use
have become militarized. Consider the examples described in the hypothetical
scenarios above, where AUMF foes gather in civilian settings, such as homes and
boarding houses. There is no doubt that a person's residence is civilian in status,
but when the home is used to house belligerents, store weapons, plan or conduct
attacks, regroup for future hostilities, train, or any number of other activities that
make an effective contribution to the war effort, that home's nature, location,
purpose, or use arguably changes in such a way that it forfeits its protected civilian
status and becomes a military objective. Again, there is still much debate on this
point, and some may apply similar rules for civilian objects as the ICRC applies to
civilians directly participating in hostilities.
Therefore, the answer to the question of whether U.S. drone strikes properly
distinguish between civilian and combatant, and between civilian object and
military objective depends upon the interpretation of when a civilian or civilian
object loses its protected status and becomes lawfully targetable. While a good
number of U.S. operations in the AUMF conflict occur in traditional skirmishes
with enemy forces, the United States typically uses drones to target individuals
outside the traditional battlefield, in civilian areas where they may or may not be
engaged in hostile activities at the time they are struck. As described in open
press, drones have targeted individuals in a number of civilian settings, including
homes and urban centers. 108 It seems that if the ICRC's interpretation of direct
participation in hostilities is used, then many of the United States' drone strikes
may not properly distinguish between combatant and civilian-particularly those
attacks against "civilians" (e.g., members of al Qaeda, Taliban, and associated
forces who perform only political, religious, or other "non-combat" functions for
the group) located in their homes. However, if one concludes that membership in
an inherently violent non-state armed group within a recognized armed conflict
severs an individual's civilian protected status, then drone strikes that target such
individuals likely meet the requirement to distinguish.
2. Are Drone Strikes Conducted Indiscriminately?
Even if drone strikes properly distinguish between combatant and civilian, the
United States must still ensure that it conducts strike operations discriminately to
meet the requirements of distinction. An indiscriminate attack can be described as
"one in which the attacker does not take measures to avoid hitting non-military
objectives, that is, civilians and civilian objects," including by "using means and
methods that... cannot be directed at specific military objectives or whose effects
by its (defacto) use.... Actual 'use' of an objective does not depend necessarily
on its original nature or on any (later) intended purpose.
Id. at 88-90.
107. AP I, supra note 47, art 52(2).
108. Joby Warrick & Peter Finn, Amid Outrage Over Civilian Deaths in Pakistan, CIA Turns to
Smaller Missiles, WASH. POST, April 26, 2010, at A8, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/04/25/AR2010042503114.html.
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cannot be limited." 10 9 In other words, indiscriminate attacks are those that by their
nature are so imprecise or ill-defimed that collateral effects are assured. Customary
law, reflected in Article 57(1) and (4) of AP 1,110 requires parties to an armed
conflict to exercise "constant care" and to "take all reasonable precautions" to
spare the civilian population and avoid damage to civilian objects.1 Article 57(3)
further requires that when given the option, parties select the military objective
most likely to "cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects."'1 12
With their ability to surveil for hours or days at a time, and to perform
surgical strikes with pinpoint accuracy, drones typically offer a cleaner alternative
to other forms of aerial bombardment or missile strikes. 13 P.W. Singer writes that
"[u]nmanned systems seem to offer several ways of reducing the mistakes and
unintended costs of war," including by using "far better sensors and processing
power.. .allow[ing] decisions to be made in a more deliberate manner," and
"remov[ing] the anger and emotion from the humans behind them." 114  "Such
exactness," Singer argues, "can lessen the number of mistakes made, as well as the
number of civilians inadvertently killed."'1 15 Senior U.S. officials have consistently
stated that "procedures and practices for identifying lawful targets" in the AUMF
conflict "are extremely robust, and advanced technologies have helped to make our
targeting even more precise."'1 16 Indeed, U.S. officials would certainly argue that
109. RoY GUTMAN & DAouD KUTTAB, Indiscriminate Attacks, in CRIMES OF WAR 2.0, 239, 239-
40 (2007).
110. See AP I, supra note 47, art. 57(1), (4).
111. Id. More specifically, Article 57(2) provides:
With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken: (a) those who
plan or decide upon an attack shall: (i) do everything feasible to verify that the
objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not
subject to special protection but are military objectives within the meaning of
paragraph 2 of Article 52 and that it is not prohibited by the provisions of this
Protocol to attack them; (ii) take all feasible precautions in the choice of means
and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing,
incidental loss or civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects;
(iii) refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated; (b) an attack shall be cancelled or
suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or is
subject to special protection or that the attack may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated; (c) effective advance warning shall be
given of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances
do not permit.
Id. at art. 57(2).
112. Id. at art. 57(3).
113. See Singer, supra note 14, at 397-98.
114. Military Robots and the Laws of War, supra note 16.
115. Id.
116. Koh, supra note 1. Koh continues: "In my experience, the principles of distinction and
proportionality that the United States applies are not just recited at meetings. They are implemented
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an advantage of using drones for targeting operations is that it actually promotes
the humanitarian objective of sparing civilians by conducting more precise attacks
on belligerents. 1 7 Still, because of the location of the strikes-typically in civilian
settings-there are almost always civilian casualties.1 1 8 Although one could argue
that drones offer a more discriminating alternative to aerial bombing or traditional
ground applications of force (tanks, long-range guns and missiles, etc.), it is
incumbent upon a drone operator and commander to exercise judgment in
determining when to conduct an attack where there are co-located civilians or
where the targets themselves are difficult to identify.
Thus, insofar as drone strikes target military objectives, combatants, or
unprivileged civilians (i.e., those who are directly participating in hostilities at the
time of the attack), and as long as such attacks are conducted with constant care,
reasonable precaution, and proper consideration of the likely collateral effects,
drones offer a more precise and adaptable means for bombardment than traditional
weapons and meet the requirement of discrimination. There may still be concern
that because of this precision and effectiveness, the decision to use force becomes
easier and more frequent. And there may also be concern with drone strikes'
dependency on reliable intelligence for acquisition of targets. However, neither
concern is unique to the employment of drones in warfare, and both are the kinds
of questions that merit consideration before any application of force, including
with drones.
C. The Principle of Proportionality
Much like the discussion on indiscriminate attacks, the principle of
proportionality considers the effects of an attack on civilian objects and civilians in
relation to the achievement of a military goal. Reflecting this principle, Article
51(5) of AP I prohibits "attack[s] which may be expected to cause incidental loss
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated."'1 9 Similarly, Article 57 requires military planners and
decision-makers to "[r]efrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be
expected to cause incidental... [but] excessive [losses]... in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated. 1 20  The U.S. Army Field Manual on
counterinsurgency, which is not a restatement of law of war requirements but does
reflect law of war-influenced U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) policy, adds to this
definition two positive commitments for combatants: (1) to "[p]reserve
noncombatant lives by limiting the damage they do," and (2) to "[a]ssume
additional risk to minimize potential harm."
' 12 1
rigorously throughout the planning and execution of lethal operations to ensure that such operations are
conducted in accordance with all applicable law."
Id.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Finn, supra note 73.
119. AP I, supra note 47, art. 51(5)(b) (emphasis added).
120. Id. art. 57(2)(a)(iii) (emphasis added).
121. U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-24: COUNTERINSURGENCY 7-30 (2006)
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Notably, the Rome Statute includes proportionality-related war crimes within
the ICC's jurisdiction - in Article 8(2)(a)(iv) for "[e]xtensive destruction and
appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out
unlawfully and wantonly," 122 and in Article 8(2)(b)(iv) for "[i]ntentionally
launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of
life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects... which would be clearly
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage
anticipated., 123 In other words, attacks that result in civilian casualties do not by
themselves constitute war crimes; but reckless attacks that result in civilian deaths
or destruction, or attacks that knowingly take civilian lives clearly in excess of
what is necessary for accomplishing the military objective could violate the
principle of proportionality and constitute war crimes.
Importantly for the AUMF and Afghanistan conflicts, although not
necessarily reflecting a legal requirement, the Field Manual on counterinsurgency
adds:
In conventional operations, proportionality is usually calculated in
simple utilitarian terms: civilian lives and property lost versus enemy
destroyed and military advantage gained. But in COIN operations,
advantage is best calculated not in terms of how many insurgents are
killed or detained, but rather which enemies are killed or detained. If
certain key insurgent leaders are essential to the insurgents' ability to
conduct operations, then military leaders need to consider their relative
importance when determining how best to pursue them. In COIN
environments, the number of civilian lives lost and property destroyed
needs to be measured against how much harm the targeted insurgent
could do if allowed to escape. If the target in question is relatively
inconsequential, then proportionality requires combatants to forego
severe action, or seek noncombative means of engagement. 124
In its current conflicts, the U.S. military has often determined that
proportionality concerns with co-located civilians prevented it from striking certain
military objectives. 125 However, in the recently reported targeting of Hussein al-
Yemeni, 126 like the reported strike on Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah
Mehsud, 127 and in addition to many other similar attacks against senior terrorist
[hereinafter FM 3-24].
122. ICC, supra note 63, art. 8(2)(a)(iv) (emphasis added).
123. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(iv) (emphasis added).
124. FM 3-24, supra note 121 (emphasis added).
125. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 1; Secrecy of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan Criticized, DAWN.COM
(Jan. 30, 2010, 11:08 AM), http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/
news/pakistan/04-drone-secrecy-criticised-qs-02.
126. David E. Sanger, Drone Strike Said to Kill a Leader ofAl Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2010,
at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/18/world/asia/18terror.html. Al-Yemeni was
reportedly a senior al Qaeda leader located in Waziristan and wanted for his involvement in the killings
of several CIA operatives in December 2009.
127. Pir Zubair Shah, Sabrina Tavernise & Mark Mazzetti, Taliban Leader in Pakistan Is
Reportedly Killed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.conV
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leaders in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere, 128 the United States has also
demonstrated at times a determination that the risks to co-located civilians were
justifiable since the targets were of sufficiently high rank and capable of
substantial future harm. Indeed, as U.S. officials have noted, targeting particular
individuals with advanced technologies often serves the purpose of avoiding
broader harm to civilians and civilian objects. 129
However, there is great disagreement on this point. Critics of drone targeting
allege that the number and frequency of civilian deaths are immensely
disproportionate to the military advantage they provide.130 Using public news
reports as sources, some estimates put civilian losses at approximately one out of
every three fatalities caused by drone attack.3 A recent survey of Pakistanis
revealed that they thought almost all the casualties from drone strikes were
civilian.132 Still others, including the Long War Journal133 and intelligence
officials, 134 place the number much lower. Some also assert that the military
advantage of many of the drone attacks is minimal to nil, because either the
importance of the target is often overstated or, more importantly, because the
civilian losses generate increased hostility among the civilian population, thereby
fueling and prolonging the hostilities.135
2009/08/08/world/asia/08pstan.html.
128. The Long War Journal reports that 1,438 al Qaeda, Taliban, and affiliate leaders and
operatives have been killed by drones since 2006. Bill Roggio & Alexander Mayer, Charting the Data
for US Airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004 2010, THE LONG WAR JOURNAL (Sept. 21, 2010, 8:22 PM),
http://www.longwarjoumal.org/pakistan-strikes.php.
129. Koh, supra note 1.
130. Secrecy of US. Drone Strikes in Pakistan Criticized, supra note 125; Rise of Drones II, supra
note 40, at 5-6.
131. NSJ Analysis: Turning Off Autopilot: Towards a Sustainable Drone Policy, HARVARD
NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL (Mar. 6, 2010), http://www.harvardnsj.con2010/03/nsj-analysis-
turing-off-autopilot-towards-a-sustainable-drone-policy/ (citing an analysis of the U.S. policy of UAV
drones strikes against al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives in Pakistan by Peter Bergen and Katherine
Tiedemann).
132. Secrecy of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan Criticized, supra note 125.
133. Roggio & Mayer, supra note 128 (referencing data that indicates 6.7% of airstrike fatalities
since 2006 have been civilian).
134. Finn & Warrick, supra note 73.
135. See, e.g., Rise of Drones II, supra note 40, at 5-6. O'Connell concluded her testimony by
arguing that:
The use of military force in counter-terrorism operations has been counter-
productive. Military force is a blunt instrument. Inevitably unintended victims
are the result of almost any military action. Drone attacks in Pakistan have
resulted in large numbers of deaths and are generally seen as fueling terrorism,
not abating it. In Congressional testimony in March 2009, counter-terrorism
expert, David Kilcullen, said drones in Pakistan are giving 'rise to a feeling of
anger that coalesces the population around the extremists and leads to spikes of
extremism well outside the parts of the country where we are mounting those
attacks.' Another expert told the New York Times, 'The more the drone
campaign works, the more it fails-as increased attacks only make the Pakistanis
angrier at the collateral damage and sustained violation of their sovereignty.'
Id. at 6.
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Determining whether drone strikes meet the requirements of proportionality
will always be a case-by-case analysis. Higher numbers of civilian casualties may
meet the proportionality test, for example, if the target is a very senior leader of the
enemy whose elimination may more likely lead to a quicker cessation of hostilities
and fewer military and non-military deaths. On the other hand, striking low-level
fighters or supporters in public places, where collateral damage is virtually
assured, may not meet the test. Thus, the number of civilians killed, or of terrorists
killed, is only the first part of the analysis-whether the target was of sufficient
value and whether the strike offered a real military advantage and was conducted
with all due caution and concern for civilians establishes the operation's
proportionality. Again, this test is not unique to drone attacks, but because drones
are used primarily and frequently in civilian contexts, the proportionality analysis
merits greater examination.
It bears noting, before moving on, that the fact that drones represent a vastly
superior tool for the application of force when compared to the enemy's
technological capabilities does not make the use of drones inherently
disproportionate. For one, the enemy's "inferior" weapons (e.g., small arms and
improvised explosive devices) have proven to be abundantly lethal. But more
importantly, the law of war does not require parties to fight with equal strength or
ability-only with equal respect for and compliance with the rules. Just as one
army's superior discipline and training does not constitute a disproportionate
advantage over an opponent's poorly-trained and undisciplined forces, use of
superior technology does not by itself violate the principles of the law of war.
Thus, remotely firing Hellfire missiles from thousands of feet in the air on
belligerents engaged in lethal operations using rudimentary explosives does not by
itself violate the principle of proportionality.
D. The Principle of Humanity
The final principle in this analysis is that of humanity. Article 22 of Hague
IV reflects the purpose of the humanity principle, affirming that "[t]he right of
belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited."1 36 Likewise,
Article 23 prohibits parties from "employ[ing] arms, projectiles, or material
calculated to cause unnecessary suffering."1 37 These same provisions are repeated
in Article 35 of AP j,138 in paragraphs 33 and 34 of the U.S. Army Field Manual on
the law of war,1 39 and in the preamble to the Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed
to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW).1 40  The
principle of humanity may be understood as the capstone of the other constraining
principles, requiring parties to a conflict to exercise restraint when an act would
136. Hague IV, supra note 45, art. 22 (emphasis added).
137. Id. art. 23 (emphasis added).
138. AP I, supra note 47, art. 35.
139. FM 27-10, supra note 67, at 33-34.
140. CCW, supra note 63.
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cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, even if it meets the
requirements of necessity, distinction, and proportionality.
To be sure, not many would assert that the application of drones as a military
tool inherently violates the principle of humanity. There is no evidence that drone
strikes themselves cause any more injury or suffering than traditional forms of
bombardment. But because of the setting in which drones are most often
employed, and because of the difficulty in ensuring that the right individuals are
being targeted, drone warfare invites more scrutiny than other forms of force. A
growing chorus of critics is claiming (perhaps a little ironically, due to their
criticism of the United States' detention policy and practices) that drone strikes are
taking the place of the more humanitarian option with regard to engaging
belligerents - capture and detention. 141 Of course, no official policy exists that
instructs operators to kill rather than detain, but critics have pointed to the fact that
since the Obama Administration came into office in 2009, hundreds of drone
strikes have been launched against high-level terrorists with no high-level captures
and detentions. 
142
Compounding this challenge is the inability of, or extreme difficulty for,
drones to accept surrender or call back strikes at late stages of deployment.
143
Consider, for example, a hypothetical operation where, as a drone heads for its
position, but before its missile hits its mark, the target looks to the skies and
unambiguously demonstrates his intent to surrender, thus rendering himself hors
de combat. On the one hand, one might argue that when conducting an aerial
bombing on a lawful target from a traditional manned aircraft, the target does not
have a right to surrender once the bombs are dropped. However, the technological
ability of drones to survey the ground before and during a strike, and abort a strike
at the latest of stages, may complicate the hypothetical. It is possible that the law
of armed conflict may require a drone to accept surrender until it is no longer
capable of doing so. The implications of such an interpretation, of course, are
considerable. After all, how is a drone flying deep into hostile territory, and
without nearby ground support (presumably the reason for the drone's use in the
first place), to accept surrender and remove the person or persons from the
battlefield? And even if this were possible, how is a drone to inform the now hors
de combat target that he is to stay in place until picked up and detained by
141. See, e.g., Asim Qureshi, The 'Obama doctrine': kill, don't detain, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 11,
2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/apr/ 1/obama-national-security-
drone-guantanamo; Karen DeYoung & Joby Warrick, Under Obama, More Targeted Killings Than
Captures in Counterterrorism Efforts, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2010, at Al, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/13/AR2010021303748.html?nav =
emailpage.
142. See, e.g., DeYoung & Warrick, supra note 141; Richard Murphy & John Radsan, Due Process
and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REv. 405, 406-14 (2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1349357.
143. The scenario of surrendering to a drone has occurred at least once. P.W. Singer writes:
"In one case, a group of Iraqi soldiers saw a Pioneer flying overhead and, rather than wait to be blown
up, waved white bed sheets and undershirts at the drone - the first time in history that human soldiers
surrendered to an unmanned system." Military Robots and the Laws of War, supra note 16.
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opposing forces? The prospect of surrendering to a drone is fraught with such
practical challenges.
However, in the vast majority of cases, strikes are conducted by surprise and
without forewarning. This fact begs another question: is the United States required
to warn civilian populations about intended drone strikes in advance of the attack?
And if so, what does that warning need to look like? Article 26 of Hague IV
requires a commander to do "all in his power" to warn "authorities" before a
bombardment, "except in cases of assault."' 144 It is not clear under this definition
who is required to receive that notification, although it is widely believed that the
United States receives some level of consent or permission from Afghan, Iraqi,
Pakistani, and Yemeni "authorities" when it conducts strikes in their respective
territories. Recently, a collection of experts gathered at Harvard University to
develop rules for aerial and missile warfare. 145 Of note, Rule 37 from the group's
manual states:
When the attack of a lawful target by air or missile combat operations
may result in death or injury to civilians, effective advance warnings
must be issued to the civilian population, unless circumstances do not
permit. This may be done, for instance, through dropping leaflets or
broadcasting the warnings. Such warnings ought to be as specific as
circumstances permit. 146
It is clear that the law of war contemplates some kind of warning before
attacks on civilian locations. However, it is also clear that there are exceptions to
the requirement to forewarn under certain situations. In the AUMF conflict, where
individuals stage attacks and conduct hostile operations from homes and public
places, the United States often depends upon the ability to strike targets when they
find them-and to do so quickly and by surprise. Presumably, an attack against a
lawful target that depends on the element of surprise for its achievement of the
military objective, if conducted as precisely as possible and with proper
consideration of the potential collateral effects, would be such an exception and fit
within the principle of humanity.
IV. LEGAL BOUNDARIES AND LIMITATIONS FOR DRONE WARFARE
By examining the law of armed conflict's fundamental principles in relation
to drone strikes, it is evident that there is plenty of law governing drone warfare-
from the Hague and Geneva Conventions and their protocols, to specialized
treaties on specific weapons, to custom and usage, and to domestic laws, rules, and
regulations. Thus far, most of the analysis in this article has been dedicated to the
targets and victims of drone strikes. This section therefore identifies and analyzes
144. Hague IV, supra note 45, art. 26.
145. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICE AND CONFLICT RESEARCH AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
Foreword to MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE (2009),
available at http://ihlresearch.org/amw/HPCR Manual.pdf [hereinafter HPCR].
146. Id. at 18. The Manual adds at Rule 39, "the obligation to take feasible precautions in attack
applies equally to UAV/UCAV operations." Id
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some of the most prominent actor-focused issues, assessing what, if any, legal
boundaries exist and some of the implications of those limitations.
A. Location of the Strike
From the hypothetical scenarios outlined in the introduction, it is clear that
location matters when it comes to military operations. When a drone strike occurs
within a recognized and accepted theater of active armed conflict, such as
Afghanistan or Iraq, there is virtually no question that the attack is covered by the
lex specialis of the law of armed conflict by virtue of geography. However, when
such an attack occurs in areas outside the traditional, geographically limited "hot"
battlefield, reasonable people disagree on whether the operation is or should be
covered by the law of armed conflict.
The most obvious current issue in this respect is the question of whether or
not the border areas of sovereign, independent Pakistan should be considered part
of the "Afghanistan theater" of conflict. This issue prompts a few questions: First,
is Pakistan part of either the Afghan conflict or the broader AUMF conflict, such
that its territory is part of a "theater of conflict"? Second, is consent from
Pakistani authorities required to conduct strikes within Pakistani territory? And
third, even without consent, does Pakistan's inability or unwillingness to take on
terrorists within their territory justify the United States from acting itself regardless
of consent? On the first question, some argue that Pakistan is not part of the
Afghan theater of war, and consequently, any drone strikes conducted in Pakistan
violate the law of armed conflict. 147 However, while there is wide disagreement on
whether Pakistan is de jure part of the Afghan theater, there is no question that at
least its border regions are de facto part of the same conflict. Actors regularly
stage attacks from the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) of Pakistan,
conduct operations into Afghanistan, only to retreat back into the FATA. 148 The
non-state participants to the conflict, therefore, do not recognize a territorially-
limited war. Moreover, there is no question that Pakistan's territory falls within
the greater AUMF theater of conflict. 149 U.S. officials have argued that the fight
with AUMF enemies is global, not confined to the territory of one country.150 In
fact, most of the leadership and many of the fighters for the AUMF parties are
located outside of Afghanistan and within Pakistan's borders.1 5 1 Thus, while the
United States may not assert an unconditional right to attack targets throughout
Pakistan at will, if Pakistan's territory is being used to continue the war against the
147. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O'Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of
Pakistan 2004-2009, in SHOOTING TO KILL: THE LAW GOVERNING LETHAL FORCE IN CONTEXT (Simon
Bronitt ed., forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1501144.
148. The Truth about Talibanistan, TIME.COM (Mar. 22, 2007), http://www.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,1601850,00.html.
149. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL
SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT 1 (2006), available at www.fas.org/
irp/nsa/doj0 1 1906.pdf [hereinafter NSA Report].
150. See, e.g., it. at 5.
151. Joby Warrick, U.S. Cites Big Gains Against Al-Qaeda, WASH. POST, May 30, 2008, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.conm/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/29/AR2008052904116-2.html?
sid=ST2008053100213.
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United States and its allies, and if Pakistan is unwilling or unable to contain the
threat, then strikes on targets in Pakistan do not violate Pakistan's right to
territorial inviolability. The argument that a conflict with a non-state actor must be
confined to a geographical boundary may seem appealing to some, but it is not
supported by law or custom and it becomes dangerously illogical when applied to
conflicts that by their nature cross borders and by definition are not between or
among territorially limited states.
That being said, and as noted above, deciding "whether a particular individual
will be targeted in a particular location will depend upon considerations specific to
each case, including those related to... the sovereignty of the other states involved,
and the willingness and ability of those states to suppress the threat the target
poses. 152 Thus, in response to the remaining two questions, obtaining a state's
consent to use force within its territory may be required under the UN Charter,153
but if a state is unable or unwilling to suppress a threat against the security of a
second or third state (in this case, Afghanistan or the United States), that second or
third state may exercise its Charter right to self defense. 15 4 According to public
reports, U.S. officials have regularly consulted Pakistani authorities when drones
have been employed for strike operations in Pakistan. 155 However, as Pakistan
maintains only limited control over large swaths of its territory - and terrorists
have used that ungoverned space to their advantage - both candidate 156 and
President Obama 157 has made clear that the United States will act if and when
Pakistan cannot.
152. Koh, supra note 1.
153. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/
charter/chapterl.shtml [hereinafter UN Charter]. Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations
provides that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Id.; see also, Hague Convention V Respecting
the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, art. 1, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2310, 205 Consol. T.S. 299 [hereinafter Hague V].
154. See UN Charter, supra note 153, art. 51. See also Koh, supra note 1; U.S. Navy, The
Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M, 7.3 (2007)
A neutral nation has the duty to prevent the use of its territory as a place of
sanctuary or a base of operations by belligerent forces of any side. If the neutral
nation is unable or unwilling to enforce effectively its right of inviolability, an
aggrieved belligerent may take such acts as are necessary in the neutral territory
to counter the activities of enemy forces, including warships and military aircraft,
making unlawful use of that territory.
155. See, e.g., Amanda Hodge, Pakistan Allowing CIA to Use Airbase For Drone Strikes, THE
AUSTRALIAN, Feb. 19, 2009, available at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/pakistan-permits-cia-
base-for-strikes/story-e6frg6t6-1 111118893683.
156. See e.g., Steve Holland, Tough Talk on Pakistan from Obama, REUTERS, Aug. 1, 2007,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0132206420070801.
157. See, e.g., R. Jeffrey Smith, Candace Rondeaux & Joby Warrick, 2 U.S. Airstrikes Offer a
Concrete Sign of Obama's Pakistan Policy, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2009, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/23/AR2009012304189.html; James
Joyner, Obama Orders Pakistan Drone Strikes, NEW ATLANTICIST, Jan. 24, 2009, available at
http://www.acus.org/new atlanticist/obama-orders-pakistan-drone-attacks.
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While the AUMF conflict is fought primarily in Afghanistan with the consent
of the Afghan government, and in Pakistan in consultation with the Pakistani
government, the AUMF contemplates a transnational, borderless war with al
Qaeda and associated forces. As al Qaeda maintains a strong presence in a number
of countries, most notably Yemen and Somalia, and uses such states to train for,
plan, and stage attacks against the United States and its allies, the United States has
reportedly conducted limited kinetic operations in such countries. 158 Somalia and
Yemen present an even more compelling case of "unwilling or unable" than
Pakistan, as both states show little semblance of governance or law and order. 159
Accordingly, the United States would likely assert the right of self-defense as the
legal rationale for drone strikes against al Qaeda and their associates in these and
potentially other failed or failing states. More challenging is whether the United
States would opt for attacking high-level targets in neutral states that do have the
capacity and/or willingness to act, such as Kenya, the Philippines, or Saudi Arabia.
Given the likely diplomatic repercussions, it is doubtful that U.S. officials would
opt for a drone strike in such countries without consent at the highest levels of their
governments. And if consent were given and U.S. personnel pulled the trigger on
a targeting operation against AUMF foes, the strike would arguably be covered
under AUMF authority and fall within the law of armed conflict. It bears noting
that to the extent that belligerents are present in the "global commons," such as
international waters, they are targetable there.1 60  However, strike operations
conducted in or from neutral waters or airspace fall under the same rules for strike
operations in or from neutral territory.
1 61
Thus, location matters, but it is not overly prohibitive. The United States has
consistently made the case that the war with al Qaeda and its terrorist associates is
of global reach. 162 The epicenter is in Afghanistan (and to a lesser extent Iraq), but
al Qaeda, as a transnational non-state actor, operates in and wages war from states
across the world. Particularly hot are the conflicts in Pakistan, Somalia, and
Yemen, although al Qaeda's presence in other countries, including in Europe, has
158. See Rise of Drones II, supra note 40 (O'Connell describes a situation in November, 2002,
where the U.S. used a drone outside a combat area "to fire laser-guided Hellfire missiles at a passenger
vehicle traveling in a thinly populated region of Yemen." The drone was operated by CIA agents based
in Djibouti).
159. See, e.g., U.N. S.C. Rep. of the Secretary-General 8, U.N. Doc. S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010);
Jeffrey D. Feltman, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Yemen on the Brink: Implications for U.S. Policy (Feb. 3, 2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/136499.htm.
160. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 19, 301, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S
397. Neutral zones, including the high seas and the air above the high seas, are reserved for "peaceful
purposes," precluding their use to conduct lethal strike operations. Id. art. 88. However, in times of
war, the law of armed conflict allows for the sea to be used for self-defense or other UN Charter-
authorized uses of force. See George K. Walker, Self-Defense, the Law of Armed Conflict and Port
Security, 5 S.C.J. INT'L L. & BUS. 347 (2009).
161. SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA §1
(Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebART/560-06?Open
Document.
162. NSA Report, supra note 149.
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led to a number of deadly attacks.163 While the United States has not and will not
respond to every terrorist threat posed by AUMF parties with military force, it has
asserted the right to do so - with the consent or cooperation of the home
government, or, if the home government is unwilling or unable to respond, without
it. 164
B. Location of the Operator
One of the most common critiques of drone warfare relates to the location of
the operator. When it became apparent that most of the Predator strikes on al
Qaeda targets were controlled far from the battlefield, in Nevada or at Langley or
any other number of locations outside the traditional battlefield and out of harm's
way, concerns with operators becoming detached and indifferent to the human
costs began to emerge. While drones eliminate many of the issues associated with
human emotion and frailty, leading to increased effectiveness and precision, some
fear that advanced technologies may "make some soldiers too calm, too unaffected
by killing." 165 Army chaplain D. Keith Shurtleff comments that "as wars become
safer and easier, as soldiers are removed from the horrors of war and see the enemy
not as humans but as blips on a screen, there is a very real danger of losing the
deterrent that such horrors provide. 166 A number of operators and commentators
have compared the drone operating experience to playing a video game, 167 with
some commenting that a person playing a video game is usually "not a benevolent
God."' 168  While many of these issues are not unique to drones, drone warfare
seems to present a number of particularly challenging ethical and moral
questions.
169
However, while further ethical or moral exploration may be required with
regard to remotely conducted attacks performed far from the battlefield, the law of
armed conflict does not present any additional limitations or prohibitions in this
respect. There is no difference under the law of war if a ship at sea fires a rocket at
a military objective hundreds or thousands of miles away ashore, or if a plane
flying thousands of feet in the air bombs a military target it never sees, or if a
domestic missile installation fires an intercontinental ballistic missile at a lawful
target half way across the globe, so long as the attacks are carried out within the
163. See Alston, supra note 6, at 7-8; Robert S. Leiken & Steven Brooke, Al Qaeda's Second
Front: Europe, N.Y. Times, July 15, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2005/07/14/opinion/14iht-edleiken.html.
164. Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, The President's
Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting
Them (Sep. 25, 2001).
165. Singer, supra note 14, at 395.
166. Id. at 396.
167. See, e.g., Eric Hagerman, Point. Click. Kill: Inside The Air Force's Frantic Unmanned
Reinvention, POPULAR SCIENCE MAGAZINE, Aug. 18, 2009, available at http://www.popsci.
com/drones.
168. Singer, supra note 14, at 395.
169. See, e.g., Mat Trachok, Predator Strikes Raise Novel Moral, Legal Issues, HARVARD
NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL, Dec. 2, 2009 available at http://www.harvardnsj.com/2009/12/
predator-strikes-raise-novel-moral-legal-issues/.
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rules of armed conflict.1 70 Similarly, the law of armed conflict does not forbid a
military operator from remotely conducting a drone strike from an air force base in
Nevada or some other location far from the target, if the strike is carried out within
the same recognized conventional and customary legal framework that any other
attack in the same armed conflict would be performed. In sum, the location of the
operator in the context of an armed conflict does not make a legal difference as
long as that operator is working under the same rules as any other individual
engaged in the conflict.
C. Status of the Operator
Probably the most controversial aspect of the drone strike program is the
status of the operator. Even some of those who are fully on board with nearly
every other aspect of drone warfare find themselves uneasy with civilian personnel
performing a combat function.1 7 1 In the broader AUMF conflict, it is reportedly
the CIA that almost exclusively operates drones for lethal strike operations.1 72 The
United States has relied heavily on the CIA to perform combat-type functions in its
current conflicts. 17 Proponents would likely argue that this is because the current
conflicts are unlike any others the United States has found itself in - with a greater
need for quick, actionable intelligence, targeting identification and acquisition,
secrecy, and swift decision-making. 174 To be sure, not many would argue that the
CIA may not perform a prominent intelligence role in the current armed conflicts,
even by using drones for reconnaissance and espionage missions. But CIA
operation of drones for lethal combat-type operations prompts a number of legal
questions.
As discussed at length in section III(B)(1) above, only lawful combatants (or
privileged belligerents) are permitted to participate in hostilities.1 75 The CIA is a
civilian agency and not a branch of the U.S. Armed Forces. Even under a liberal
reading of Article 4 from GC III, the CIA would not meet the requirements of
lawful belligerency as a militia or volunteer corps because, while they do report to
a responsible chain of command (albeit not always a military chain of command),
as a group they do not wear uniforms or otherwise distinguish themselves, nor do
they carry their arms openly. CIA personnel are therefore unprivileged
170. It should be noted here that the same rules regarding neutral zones described in the "location
of the strike" section above apply equally here to the location of the operator. See supra Section IV(A).
171. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Predators Over Pakistan, 15 WEEKLY STANDARD 24, Mar. 8,
2010, available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/predators-over-pakistan; David Glazier,
Testimony Before the House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Apr. 28, 2010 available at
http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/subcommitteesNSSubcommittee/4.28.10_DronesII/Glazier
_Statement.pdf.
172. See Jane Mayer, The Predator War: What are the risks of the C.I.A. 's covert drone program,
NEW YORKER, Oct. 26, 2009, available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/09102
6fa fact mayer.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See Baxter, supra note 92; GOLDMAN & TITTEMORE, supra note 51, at 2-4.
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belligerents1 76 in this conflict.1 77  This may not prohibit the United States from
using CIA or other civilian personnel to conduct drone strikes, but the participating
civilians join the fight without the combatant's privilege and lose their protected
civilian status.178 While engaged CIA personnel become targetable as combatants,
it is unclear whether CIA personnel would also be prosecutable as unlawful
belligerents for their participation in the hostilities.1 79  Some have questioned
whether requiring a uniformed service-member to "pull the trigger" in a "right
seat-left seat" situation with the CIA might solve this issue. After all,
reconnaissance, target identification, and remote piloting do not by themselves
constitute acts of belligerency. However, applying the direct participation
analysis, CIA personnel involved in preparing for, assisting, and setting up hostile
acts perform a combat function, have likely already given up their civilian
protected status, and do not need to actually pull the trigger in order to cross the
line into a combatant role.
There is some speculation that the CIA only conducts drone attacks outside
"traditional battlefields," leaving Afghan and Iraqi operations to the military. Jane
Mayer writes: "The U.S. government runs two drone programs. The military's
176. But see ICRC DPH Guidance, supra note 96, at 39 (stating even the ICRC allows some
civilians, if incorporated into the forces, may take on a combatant status in certain situations:
As long as they are not incorporated into the armed forces, private contractors
and civilian employees do not cease to be civilians simply because they
accompany the armed forces and or assume functions other than the conduct of
hostilities that would traditionally have been performed by military personnel...
• A different conclusion must be reached for contractors and employees who, to
all intents and purposes, have been incorporated into the armed forces of a party
to the conflict, whether through a formal procedure under national law or defacto
by being given a continuous combat function. Under IHL, such personnel would
become members of an organized armed force, group, or unit under a command
responsible to a party to the conflict and, for the purposes of the principle of
distinction, would no longer qualify as civilians.
177. Gary Solis argues exactly this point in a recent Washington Post editorial. See Gary Solis,
CIA Drone Attacks Produce America's Own Unlawful Combatants, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2010,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/1 /AR20100311036
53.html.
178. Id. (asserting that CIA personnel, as unlawful combatants, might be targetable as a class
anywhere by current enemies-even driving to work at Langley).
179. It can be argued that the United States takes the position that unprivileged belligerency is a
violation of the law of war. As an example, the Military Commissions Act of 2009 criminalizes
activities committed by unprivileged belligerents (i.e., conspiracy, material support, and murder in
violation of the law of war) that would not be war crimes if committed by lawful combatants committed
during the course of an international armed conflict. However, this is controversial. The ICRC DPH
Guidance asserts that:
The absence in IHL of an express right for civilians to directly participate in
hostilities does not necessarily imply an international prohibition of such
participation. Indeed, as such, civilian direct participation in hostilities is neither
prohibited by IHL nor criminalized under the statutes of any prior or current
international criminal tribunal or court.
The ICRC notes, though, that such civilians may "not enjoy immunity from domestic prosecution for
lawful acts of war, that is, for having directly participated in hostilities while respecting IHL." ICRC
DPH Guidance, supra note 96, at 83-84.
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version, which is publicly acknowledged, operates in the recognized war zones of
Afghanistan and Iraq, and targets enemies of U.S. troops stationed there. As such,
it is an extension of conventional warfare. The C.I.A.'s program is aimed at terror
suspects around the world, including in countries where U.S. troops are not
based."'180  This may reflect a political or diplomatic decision not to introduce
military elements into countries where the United States does not maintain an
active military presence. However, some suggest that the CIA's role in the
recognized war zones might be greater than Mayer's assessment.181 Either way,
because the United States treats the AUMF conflict as an armed conflict that
extends beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, the CIA participates within the framework
of that armed conflict whenever they target AUMF enemies.
A number of critics also point to the lack of accountability for CIA drone
strikes as reason for concern. O'Connell, for example, claims that CIA personnel
are not trained in the laws of war and do not take into account the constraints
imposed by that legal framework when conducting strike operations. 18 2  The
military, in contrast, is trained in the laws of war and expected to comply with
them, perform all operations under a strict command structure, and are held
accountable for their actions under the Uniform Code for Military Justice. In
addition, the military is subject to its own internal rules and regulations as well as
the guidance from its commanders that further restrain its personnel.183 Of course,
this is not to say that the CIA does not require its personnel to abide by many of
the same rules with equal rigor and accountability-they certainly may. But the
public does not know what rules apply and neither does the enemy, in contrast to
the military's requirement for transparency in promulgating its rules and
regulations.
Finally, in addition to the civilian-military status issue, there is an obscure but
emerging computer-human status issue in this area. Verging on the stuff of science
fiction, "autonomous UAVs" may become a reality in the near future. Singer
writes,
As military robots gain more and more autonomy... [a]utonomous robots
could, in theory, follow the rules of engagement; they could be
programmed with a list of criteria for determining appropriate targets
and when shooting is permissible. The robot might be programmed to
require human input if any civilians were detected. An example of such
a list at work might go as follows: "Is the target a Soviet-made T-80
tank? Identification confirmed. Is the target located in an authorized
180. Mayer, supra note 172.
181. See e.g., Rise in Drones II, supra note 40, at 6 (recounting an interview with a former drone
commander from Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada, where the commander admitted that all Air Force
drone operations were conducted jointly -or with CIA participation).
182. Id. at 8.
183. See FM 3-24, supra note 121; FM 27-10, supra note 67; also consider General Stanley
McChrystal's "zero-tolerance" policy on civilian deaths in Afghanistan. See McChrystal Apologizes as
Airstrike Kills Dozens in Afghanistan, CNN.CoM, Feb. 23, 2010, available at http://www.cnn.
com/2010/ WORLD/asiapcf/02/22/afghanistan.civilian.strike/index.html.
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free-fire zone? Location confirmed. Are there any friendly units within
a 200-meter radius? No friendlies detected. Are there any civilians
within a 200-meter radius? No civilians detected. Weapons release
authorized. No human command authority required."
184
Such a prospect presents serious challenges to the law of war framework. For
one, having a human responsible for his or her actions serves as a deterrent to
violations of the law.185 Allowing a computer to "make" life or death decisions
severs this chain of responsibility. Second, robots do not meet the definition of
lawful combatants and may not participate independently in combat operations.
1 6
And third, while humans may commit errors due to emotion, fatigue, or other
factors, human judgment is often critical in exercising restraint in armed conflict.
Taking Singer's scenario as an example, it is hard to imagine how a drone might be
programmed to account for distinction when the enemy's status is inherently
unclear, or for proportionality when the situation calls for a difficult decision on
calculating the worth of human life, or for humanity when the strike might not be
worth the human costs. Humans are required by the law of armed conflict to
exercise judgment and restraint, and programming into a drone the standard rules
of engagement is a start, but human judgment ultimately requires human operators.
V. CONCLUSION: DOES THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT PROVIDE ADEQUATE RULES
TO GOVERN DRONE WARFARE?
As this analysis has demonstrated, there are more than enough rules for
governing drone warfare - from the laws governing aerial and missile warfare to
the fundamental principles of the law of armed conflict, to specialized weapons
treaties and the Hague and Geneva conventions, and from customary law to the
UN Charter. The issue is whether these rules are fairly and consistently followed.
Correctly, the Obama Administration has stated that "the rules that govern
targeting do not turn on the type of weapon system used, and there is no
prohibition under the laws of war on the use of technologically advanced weapons
systems in armed conflict-such as pilotless aircraft or so-called smart bombs-so
long as they are employed in conformity with applicable laws of war. 187 Drones
may present interesting new challenges because of their sophistication and the
technological advantage they convey to their operators, but the law of armed
conflict is more than adequate to govern their wartime deployment. The United
States has stated that it is committed to ensuring that targeting practices are
lawful.188  To this end, the Administration has "carefully reviewed the rules
governing targeting operations to ensure that these operations are conducted
consistently with law of war principles," concluding that "targeting practices,
including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles,
comply with all applicable law, including the laws of war., 189 In sum, properly
184. Military Robots and the Laws of War, supra note 16.
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conducted drone attacks, which take into account all the constraining principles
from the law of war, target lawful objectives, and are performed by privileged
belligerents, do not violate the law of armed conflict.
Drawn from the above analysis, then, I close by offering ten guiding
principles for conducting drone strikes within the letter and spirit of the law of war:
One: Any drone strike must be necessary for the accomplishment of an actual
military objective.
Two: A drone strike must be directed only at lawful targets-i.e., combatants,
civilians who have forfeited their protections by directly participating in hostilities,
and military objectives.
Three: Commanders and operators must not authorize a drone strike when
they know or reasonably should know that the strike will cause excessive collateral
effects to civilians or civilian property.
Four: Commanders and operators must strike a proportional balance between
the risk to civilians or civilian objects and the military advantage expected when
using drones to conduct attacks.
Five: Commanders and operators must exercise constant care and reasonable
precaution to spare the civilian population from death and destruction.
Six: Commanders and operators must not conduct drone strikes where there is
a high likelihood that the strike will cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous
injury.
Seven: A drone strike must be conducted within the framework of an actual
armed conflict.
Eight: A drone strike should be conducted only by lawful combatants.
Nine: Commanders and operators should receive prior consent (even if
blanket approval) from the state in whose territory the strike will occur, unless that
state is unwilling or unable to control the threatening activities within its own
territory.
Ten: Although not required by law, commanders and operators may benefit in
certain circumstances from pursuing a non-lethal course of action if a target might
just as easily be captured and detained, within reason and subject to force
protection concerns.
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